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Editorial Notes

THE excitement caused on the Continent by Bultmann's assertion that the message of the New Testament must be "demythologized" in order to become meaningful in the contemporary world is beginning to be felt in England. The controversy is one that manifestly concerns not only academic theologians but every preacher of the Gospel. When it is said that preaching must be Biblical, does this mean that the preacher is bound to the categories of thought, the world-picture, and the universe of discourse of Hebrew and Hellenistic antiquity? In practice, the fashionable trend towards "Biblical theology" seems often to work out that way, with the consequence that those who follow it become less and less intelligible to most of the laity who might listen to them. In this connexion we wish to recommend a very wise and discerning lecture by Professor H. H. Farmer—*The Bible and Preaching*.[1] Even preachers who have not yet heard of Bultmann will study it with profit, and it will have a steadying effect on any who are realizing the explosive nature of the latest theological import from Germany.

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Another single lecture, which may not receive the attention it deserves, is Mr G. Kitson Clark's William Ainslie Memorial Lecture, entitled *Elizabeth by the Grace of God*.[2] The lecturer began with this agreeable apology for adding to the literature on the Coronation after it was all over: "To talk about the Coronation now may well seem to be committing the same indiscretion as that of a man who should want to sing 'Good King Wenceslaus' in that slack period in January when the bills come in and parents are beginning to wonder which of the traditional infectious diseases has been effectively exchanged at the last children's party." Mr Kitson Clark proceeded, however, to say many things about the history of monarchy and the place of power in politics which will bear reading long after most of the discourses of this memorable year have been forgotten.

Bultmann: Two Assessments from Germany

THE interest aroused by Bultmann's theology in this country has been considerable, but confined to academic circles. In Germany it has in some places had an influence upon the parishes. One result of

[1] Joseph Smith Memorial Lecture. Berean Press, 20 Brighton Road, Birmingham, 12. 2s. 2d., post free.

[2] Published at St Martin-in-the-Fields, 1s.

this has been a request by the Württemberg Landeskirchentag for a statement upon this subject from the theological faculty of the University of Tübingen. This was composed by a number of theologians in the faculty and delivered on 11 March 1952. It was published under the title "For and against Bultmann's Theology" (*Für und wider die Theologie Bultmanns*) by J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) in Tübingen. Another is a similar request by the Evangelical Church of Westphalia to the *Dozentenkollegium* of the theological school in Bethel near Bielefeld, whose resulting statement has been published by the Bethel Institute under the title of "Bultmanns Entmythologisierung".[1] Both publications are of interest for their clear understanding and shrewd judgment, and because they represent two different emphases within Lutheranism.

The Tübingen theologians begin with the warning that the present crisis in theology will be misunderstood if it is thought that it has been provoked by Bultmann and founded on the idiosyncrasies of his own theological outlook. It must be seen rather against the background of a much larger religious and theological history. The great theme of theology has been for more than two hundred years the statement of its doctrines in relation to the Enlightenment and to the new understanding of the world based on reason and experience, arising out of the discussion in this sphere which has proceeded in the West. One result of this argument was that in the nineteenth century Catholicism carried out a reinstatement of scholastic philosophy.

Evangelical theology has, on the other hand, undertaken the task of expressing Christian truth in terms of the thought-forms of the new age. That it has thus been exposed to great dangers is perfectly clear: indeed it has risked the loss of the very essence of the Christian faith. But this reflects the greatness and the difficulty of the task. The statement that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church does not mean that her Lord protects her against temptation and so guards her being against the movements of history. Rather will he rescue her from temptation ever and again, while she takes on the task of proclaiming the gospel to each successive generation.

Theology's great work in the nineteenth century was the adoption of the philological and historical method and its thorough application to the Bible. The results of this critical approach seemed to arrive at a full dissolution of the history of revelation into a myth, and then into an irreconcilable opposition between the gospel of Jesus and the gospel taught by Jesus, finally at the identification of the apostolic preaching with the religions of that time. The correction of this process has taken place less through the opposition which it has aroused than through the criticism which the philological and historical method has turned upon itself; critics have made great advances in understanding the character and presuppositions of their method. Thus criticism has not only modified its extreme results but

[1] The Tübingen authors remain anonymous. Those of the Bethel school are A. Adam, W. Brandt, J. Fichtner, H. Frey, G. Friedrich, H. Girgensohn, H. Greeven, H. Kraemer, H. J. Stoebe, H. H. Wolf.

has also acknowledged that the riches of the content of the subject-matter cannot be diminished nor its certainty shaken.

Bultmann's theological position lies at the intersection of two historical lines of development. On one side he is bound up with the traditions of liberalism; and the questions which liberalism raised have not yet been properly answered, but through Bultmann are again demanding the consideration which is their due. On the other side his exposition of the New Testament is determined by the return to Luther, which after the first world war was given a new impetus. Bultmann desires to be in one and the same person a free critic of the Bible as historian and philologist, and also an evangelical for whom Christ crucified and justification by faith alone form the centre of Scripture. These two sides are fused into one and are not found merely accidentally in the same person. Thus it is part of his anti-liberal self that he will have as little as possible to do with the historical Jesus who was the idol of the nineteenth century, and that he distinguishes Christian faith sharply from its factual foundation. In this he appeals to Luther and his quarrel with the catholic conception of belief. Bultmann's faith, then, rests on a foundation which is not only independent of historical criticism but which also shows its "reformed" character the more clearly as the historical element in the New Testament is subjected to criticism. Bultmann's very freedom with the New Testament proceeds from the certainty of a belief which trusts in the gospel's power to defend its truth against any criticism. But this double loyalty does set up a tension—a tension reflected in the fact that some, not only among parish clergy but also in the faculty of theology in Tübingen, sharply oppose him because they see the dangers of his position, while others accept the task of testing their own theology against his own radical questions. Doubt about how Bultmann should be appraised is reflected not only in the fact that some defend and some oppose him, but also in the division which exists in the mind of each individual theologian on this point.

Bultmann and Existentialism

It would be a misunderstanding to say of Bultmann that he has fallen into the very great danger which philosophical exponents of Christianity have often allowed to entrap them, namely that of accepting only those elements in the gospel which harmonize with their philosophical theory, and of interpreting the whole gospel only in the way which such a theory suggests; all the dangers of such a position are present, but it is not possible to condemn Bultmann simply on these grounds: for it was only by the means offered in Neoplatonism that the Church could fashion trinitarian and christological doctrine. Luther and Barth can utter their protests against philosophy and at the same time remain theologians because they stand within a theological tradition which is saturated with philosophy.

Again, a new philosophical statement of Christianity may minimize or lose some precious parts of the gospel, but it may also—and

often does—grasp anew elements of Biblical truth which had previously been neglected or minimized. Further, existentialism has respectable ancestry in Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard. As with them, so with Bultmann and his exposition of the New Testament, the confines of existentialist philosophy are transcended, since it is recognized that the ultimate riddle of human life is not contained within that life alone, nor is it to be solved within the sphere of human effort alone.

But does Bultmann's existentialism result in his limiting the act of redemption to the Cross of Christ? It seems indeed that for Bultmann not only the birth, life, and teaching of Jesus, but also his resurrection, receive their illumination from Golgotha. He is aware that the Cross cannot be regarded as the redemptive act of God if we think of it by itself as a bare historical event: when the Cross is preached, God must also be preached as active in the Cross, offering to man new hope, and offering it to him now, in the present, through that preaching. Yet Bultmann makes no statement of the satisfaction done to God's righteousness, of the redemption not only of man but of the whole creation, of the victory of Christ over demons, illness, and death, nor of the looking forward to the consummation when this victory will be made manifest in a new heaven and a new earth.

On the other hand, it might well be argued that Luther also was accused of impoverishing the gospel when he took his stand on justification by faith alone. For while it is no doubt an abbreviation of the gospel to point to one element in it alone, such a criticism should be made only by those who themselves never forget this one element, since it is the one thing necessary, and the "needle's eye" path into the world of full objective belief. Some see the possibility of Bultmann's walking that path in the light of a conception which he badly needs to develop much further, namely what he calls the self-evidence of belief; such a development might provide the means by which all that evangelical orthodoxy desires may be rewon.

The Demythologizing of the New Testament

The word "Entmythologisierung" is a sin against the German language and one of the least happy of Bultmann's creations. It is ambiguous and leads to error and misunderstanding. He would do his views a great service if he would withdraw it and substitute another. (The authors apparently have none to suggest.)

In so far as the term means only the process of disembarrassing the eternal gospel of the forms in which it is embodied and making it intelligible to the present day, there is nothing in the insistence on its importance to cause anxiety to any Christian. But what has loosed the great controversy about Bultmann is the extent of the New Testament matter which has been brought by him into the maelstrom of demythologizing.

If Bultmann had meant that the teaching of the New Testament must be supplanted by statements which are scientifically acceptable, at least in those cases where their form is not compatible with the yardstick provided by a modern naturalistic view of the world and

history, all would agree in rejecting him, for this would mean the end of theology. Some fear that this is what Bultmann means, but others believe that the issue rather is that sayings couched in the language of a human world-outlook should not be taken for the Word of God. Here is a parallel to the great "shrinking process" already met in which nothing is left but bare existence before God and in which it is revealed that faith is directed towards—not sayings, not even Biblical sayings, but, as Luther put it, towards the *nuda vox Dei.*

Demythologizing involves, then, either the substitution of modern forms of expression for those of the New Testament, in which case we should have to withstand it with every weapon at our command; or it involves an exposition—an interpretation—of the New Testament forms of expression. Bultmann has explained clearly that for him demythologizing does not mean the elimination of myth but its interpretation. But how he personally understands it is not so important as the influence which the conception has on the future.

If we ask the crucial question which the whole controversy raises, "Is what is meant by 'faith in Jesus Christ' the same for Bultmann as for the New Testament and as for the credal statements of the reformers?" we find some critics apprehensive that in Bultmann's interpretation the objective ground of the original faith has been lost, and that only a subjective believing remains. Does faith for him mean the reaching out towards a transcendent divine "Opposite", or has it not been reduced to an immanent condition in man? Does not the story of our redemption lose its historical reality? And is not faith made entirely dependent on itself as a venture to be made ever and again, with no relation to what has been done in Jesus Christ for all time, and without reaching out towards the goal of final fulfilment which lies in the future?

To reach an understanding on these questions is a task beset with the great difficulties involved in the lack of certainty in the meaning which ought to be attached to the terms employed in expressing these objections, no less than that of those used in defining Bultmann's own position. Neither is clear.[1] Bultmann indeed makes us wonder whether transcendent and immanent, objective and subjective, actuality, historical fact, past and future, are all terms which in their employment in statements about the Christian revelation are so pertinent as they have been presumed to be. Discussion with Bultmann makes it necessary for both partners in the debate to remain carefully conscious of the meaning and limit of applicability of the terms which he is using and the sense in which the other partner is using them.

Moreover, to make in any case a complete disjunction between the act of faith and the reality in which we believe is to forget that this is far from being the doctrine of the New Testament. Faith is itself

[1] It is reported that in a recent argument another scholar protested to Bultmann that he could not believe it was necessary for him to understand the distinction between "existentiel" and "existential" in order to be a Christian.

the present work of God *in* me exactly as much as the work done once for all *for* me. Only with this understanding of faith itself as the work of God in us can we say that justification of the sinner takes place through faith. The act of God in Christ cannot be separated from the act of faith as the present actualization of this act; conversely, faith can just as little be separated from the act of God in Christ. The act of redemption by God in Christ is directed towards faith, and it further follows that the proclamation—the preaching—of the Word can no more be separated from the redemptive act of God and the act of faith which receives it than these two could be separated from one another.

Bultmann is right to give prominence to this fact, that the Christian faith will not fit into the current subject-object schema, and this is his object in insisting that faith involves a new self-realization (Selbsverständnis) of man, that every saying about God and revelation is a saying about man. This point of view and the way it is held by Bultmann is severely tested by the example of the Resurrection of Christ. Bultmann's view is that the Resurrection has never been proclaimed by the Church as a fact which could be separated from the Cross, and whose historical truth could be established apart from faith. The raising of Christ is God's "Yes" to the Cross, and the preaching of the risen Christ makes plain that Jesus Christ crucified is a present actuality and for this reason victorious over sin and death.

Thus it is on the question of the historicity of the Resurrection that Bultmann is most open to criticism. He is right to make clear that we have access to the Resurrection of Christ only through the witness of faith of the apostles, that the risen Christ himself meets us only in the word of preaching, that the message of the Resurrection takes its departure from faith alone and in faith alone can find assent. But this insistence on making no separation between fact and faith in the matter of the Resurrection does not escape the confusion of making no distinction between them. Thus the Resurrection itself seems to pass over into Resurrection faith. It is therefore no wonder that the simple Christian looks in vain in Bultmann for his faith. This is a serious objection to Bultmann but cannot be the only standard by which to judge, for the simple believer also is beset with dangers against which theology must be watchful.

Theology will in the discharge of this duty come under the suspicion of wishing to estrange itself from simple faith: there are situations in which it is not possible completely to allay such suspicions, but even in them theology cannot envisage the possibility of ceasing to carry out its work with all sense of responsibility, patience, reverence, and love; in so doing it will ask for a judgment which avoids haste in matters concerning that faith whose knowledge is its subject-matter.

The theologians of Bethel are more radical and less sympathetic: for them the main question is, "Is it really possible to set forth and to interpret the Cross as scandal and as message of salvation in non-mythical terms?"—at any rate if we are to put it in Bultmann's language; and Bultmann's answer is that it is not only possible but

that it is essential, even that the New Testament has itself begun this task and that the process thus initiated has only to be extended.

They proceed to some radical and profound criticism: Bultmann claims that his interpretation of the original Christian preaching is independent of the historical events of the "salvation-history". But his demythologizing and his argument for its necessity cannot be separated from his conception of the history of early Christianity, nor this from any systematic presentation of the original Christian message: the very reason why he regards demythologizing as necessary is his conception of the history, since this conception is that the myths of the New Testament do not belong to history but are the expression of the beliefs of the disciples in terms borrowed from Judaistic Apocalyptic, Hellenism, and Gnosis.

Apart from the objection that this is really a theory based on a judgment of the historical element, we may ask how on this theory Christianity came to divide itself, as Bultmann admits freely that it did, from both Judaism and Hellenism. Again, the original Christian tradition appeals to eye-witnesses of facts, not merely to witnesses to experience. Did these fill out the bare history of Jesus with mythological material? Or did the evangelists, for example, thus embroider their material, but in such a way as to retain the confidence of the eye-witnesses? What does Bultmann make of Luke 1. 1–4?

It seems then an arguable viewpoint that the Gospel, which is claimed to be in mythological form, itself claims to convey history; this is no less true of St Paul, who is wrongly conceived of as a maker of myth, since he claims to convey tradition. We may distinguish between the history of Jesus and the preaching of the Christ, but we may not separate them: the relation between them does not correspond in Bultmann's account to that implied by the original witnesses to the Gospel. For them the preaching is empty if it is not formed and filled by events in the life of Jesus, especially the event of the resurrection; since it is claimed in the gospels and elsewhere that the teaching that he who died has yet conquered death and reigns is the teaching given by the risen Christ himself, and it is he who sends forth the disciples with this *kerygma*.

There are several other points on which this statement is radically opposed to Bultmann: for example, the "scandal" of the Cross in the New Testament is that he who was rich became poor, that he who might claim eternal joy endured the Cross, while for Bultmann the actual death of Jesus is no more than a tragic fate, and becomes a "scandal" only when it is combined with the claim to Messiahship; again, the "eschatological now" of Bultmann means the present act of preaching and the present act of the hearer's decision, but while this is true to the New Testament in part, it leaves out the essential reference to a goal in the future, with its accompanying notion of a new "people of God" who are more than an aggregation of individual conversions. But the main objection raised by this latter statement presents with salutary directness a stubborn problem to all critical students of the New Testament, which can be summed up in

the authors' own words: "It must be granted that the certainty of faith does not rest upon historical research; but the believer is not thereby excused from answering the question: 'What actually happened?' For he has committed himself to a Gospel which comes to him with a report of actual events."

Whether therefore we sympathize with Bultmann, or the assessment from Tübingen, or the more adverse criticism from Bethel, we are invited by the very nature of the problem to give some answer to those questions which the Tübingen theologians remind us were raised by liberalism, were abandoned rather than solved or shown to be irrelevant, and are now in Bultmann demanding new consideration. Bultmann is rightly set before us as no isolated instance. His problems are the problems of theology, and they are as yet unsolved.

ROBERT LEANEY.

Great Pastors—X. Evelyn Underhill

"MIXED PASTURE" is the title she gave to one of her books, but as a matter of fact all her books were pastoral in character. "I would rise from the dead to preach", said Stevenson. "I have never heard you do anything else", was Lamb's reply to Coleridge's question regarding the latter's early preaching efforts. Evelyn Underhill was as fully engaged in pastoral work as they in homiletical, and with an equal spontaneity and unselfconsciousness.

It was part of her psychological "make-up", with its singularly sensitive power of sympathy. If it is true, as Paul Elmer More said, that love is the outreaching power of the imagination by which we grasp and make real to ourself the being of others, she had it in an eminent degree. Her imagination was acute, penetrating, and generous. Except for its unusual freedom from self-reference hers was what is commonly known as the artistic temperament. To the natural inheritance of a delicately sensitive mind was added the refinement of all that education and culture could supply. She had an eye alert and avid for every kind of beauty, an ear to love music and make poetry, and a hand dexterous with pencil and all kinds of craftsmanship. In her early years she lived in an atmosphere not unlike that of classical Greece at its best, in the midst of an intellectual society where good talk abounded. She had a wide and first-hand acquaintance of the "world" in its most attractive form, and could be "all things to all men" on their own level. After her "conversion" in 1907 all her inherited and acquired powers of head and heart were devoted to the most august ends. Later on those ends were made clearer to and more fully accepted by her when a very holy woman (a contemplative in Assisi) gave her as a "direction" the words: "In torment and effort to serve the brethren".

No photograph gives any idea of the "aura" of her personality; but inadequate though the portraits are it is instructive to note the change from the almost tragic intensity of the earlier examples to the compassionate serenity of her maturity, when she had learnt the "gentleness, tranquillity, and strength" which St John of the Cross

picks out as marks of the Holy Ghost. It seems natural to compare her qualifications for the pastoral office with those of St Francis de Sales. She had his combination of breeding, culture, and sanity, which gave a characteristic note to their sanctity. Their wholeness was an element of their holiness: their naturalness an effective feature of their supernatural life. Nothing was forced, artificial, or strained.

In a true sense, then, this pastoral ministry was her "vocation"; and this, of course, is the essential requirement for its efficacy. A sense of vocation will alone supply the right motive and support for its exercise, when one's own natural energy is exhausted and when one's own natural compassion is depleted. From the first she had been "drawn" to the study of Mysticism, but always it was an "active" Mysticism which she admired and practised. The kind of person she admired shows the kind of person she herself was. In writing of Abbé Huvelin, whom she revered, we have a glimpse of her own personality: "Huvelin was a brilliant Hellenist, a man of subtle intellect and delicate sensibility; who sacrificed a possibly great career in scholarship to his passionate love of souls." The last sentence indicates her sense of values and the character of her own vocation. She combined a metaphysical passion for absolutes with an intense compassion for the least of human needs. She had no use for what she called the "museum-like atmosphere of much traditional piety", and was always anxious that Martha should not be under-rated by those who admired Mary.

From the nature of her books it was inevitable that she should be consulted by their readers on matters concerning their own spiritual life, and in this way her work as a pastor began and grew to almost overwhelming proportions. One who knew her well states that she was seldom without materials for correspondence within reach, and that on railway journeys or in the intervals for a meal on motoring trips she would be busily engaged in answering her letters. When the time came after her death to produce a selection of these replies the editor was embarrassed by the material available. As Pastoralia they provide a rich mine for the student. In addition to her quick intuition and sympathy she possessed an extensive knowledge of the latest findings of psychology, sufficient to evade its snares and to use its insights, so that she was able to pierce into her correspondents' feelings and perplexities and to give them shrewd counsel whose profundity may be largely concealed by its seeming simplicity. She had a "Listener's Lure"; that is, she was patient and humble enough (unlike some directors) to discover the other person's point of view before venturing to give her own. A most necessary example for those engaged in the cure of souls.

All this, of course, was personal and private, known only to the individuals with whom she dealt, but after a while her pastoral ministry became more public as she became better known; and she was increasingly in demand as a lecturer and, pre-eminently, a giver of Retreats. Rather against her own inclination she was induced to give addresses to clergy; and the report of what she said is at hand in

the little volume entitled *Concerning the Inner Life* (consisting of addresses in Liverpool) and two addresses on "The Parish Priest and the Life of Prayer", given to Worcester clergy and now to be found in *Collected Papers*. In them with characteristic diffidence combined with confidence she speaks as a pastor to pastors, from heart to heart, knowing as a laywoman the needs of the flock, and through her imaginative sympathy entering deeply into the needs of the shepherd. Of recent publications on the pastoral office these addresses hold a conspicuously high place, by their exalted ideals and their plain common sense, rebuking, inspiring, alluring, and encouraging their readers to "give their life for their sheep", to grudge no sacrifice and shrink from no effort in their care for "the flock which Christ hath purchased with his own blood".

(*a*) She maintained that the life of every real Christian must be pastoral in character; it has a horizontal as well as a vertical relationship. "The right movement of the soul is first towards God, and then back again towards our fellow men. . . . The real object of our union with God is not devotional feeling but work" (*The Churchman*, 22 July 1922). The mysterious thing called influence involves for all of us an inescapable responsibility, and a sure sign of our incorporation in Christ is a "wide-spreading love towards all in common".

(*b*) This undeniable but frequently overlooked truth has for the ordained pastor a peculiarly sacred significance. It is warp and woof of his ordination vows. He is put into a parish as "a dedicated agent of the divine love"; and it is with a passionately strong sense of his supernatural calling that she emphasizes the immense demands that are made upon him, greater and different in kind from those of the lay Christian. "The soul of a priest stands in a special relation towards God and other souls. He has spiritual problems which are special to himself. He is one of the assistant shepherds, not one of the sheep. He has got to stick it out in all weathers; to be always ready, always serving, always eager to feed and save. . . . And he has got to maintain his own supplies, his own religious health and suppleness, in a manner adequate to that demand; so to deepen his own life, that he is capable of deepening the lives of others."

(*c*) The purpose and end of all his labour is God; and therefore the pastor needs an increasing enrichment of his sense of God, especially in the contemporary world, where popular religion is apt to be shallow, bright, humanitarian, and easy-going. The fear of God is the only fear that is absent from men to-day; and, as Jung would admit, this is the cause of most of our other phobias. The pastor's first duty is to correct this; not initially to make men good but to make them godly. The Christian pastor must be anti-Pelagian in his ethics and Christ-centred in his evangel. Evelyn Underhill would willingly have made her own a remark of John Oman: "Nothing else concerned Jesus (in his ministry) except the friendship with God which makes all burdens light. If he could not make men friends with God he did not seem to think it worth while doing anything

less. He would not have troubled to cross the street to make the most disreputable publican into the most respectable, church-going Pharisee." And equally would she have sympathized with Bishop Timothy Rees' point of view when he quoted with approval the words: "The pursuit of holiness is the curse of Christianity." The pastor's business is to make men friends of God. Everything else follows from that.

(*d*) Consequently the care of his own interior life is of primary importance. This is why her addresses to the Liverpool clergy were entitled "Concerning the Inner Life". "There you are, moving through life: immersed in the world of succession and change, constantly claimed by the little serial duties and interests of your career, and yet ringed round by the solemn horizon of eternity, informed by its invisible powers. And—because you are priests—even more than is the case with other men, all that you do, feel, and think as you move through this changing life, is going to affect all the other souls whom you touch, and condition their relation with that unchanging Real. . . . You are held tight in that double relationship; to those changing other souls, and to that Changeless God. What you are like, and what your relation to God is like; this must and will affect all those whom you visit, preach to, pray with, and to whom you give the sacraments. . . . And what you are like, is going to depend on your secret life of prayer; on the steady orientation of your souls to the Reality of God. Called upon to practise in their fulness the two great commandments, you can only hope to get the second one right, if you are completely controlled by the first. And that will depend on the quality of your secret inner life." (Op. cit., pp. 15–16.)

(*e*) This love of God will expel from the pastor's heart the insidious and malignant love of self which vitiates under its cunning disguises so much of what is good in his ministry. Evelyn Underhill quotes Abbé Huvelin's remarks concerning the necessary preparation for the pastoral office. A seminary is not "a house of studies or a place where men learn to preach"—it is a place where they "strive to kill an egoism that is ever reviving" (*Spectator*, 25 February 1928). She herself was well aware of the subtle self-regard which can creep into the pastoral relationship. Charles Williams in his Introduction to her "Letters" says of her: "There was sometimes a moment's spiritual envy, a transient jealousy . . . as, for example, when one or more of her people suddenly veered towards another teacher." But it was only a momentary flash of feeling, for she well knew that the true pastor never clutches or allows his sheep to cling. He is chary in his use of the pronoun "my"; and such a phrase as "my penitents" is never on his lips. In giving counsel he is careful to be a director and not a dictator, and his advice is not stereotyped. Evelyn Underhill's favourite adjective "supple", combined with her reminder that "Holiness, the perfect correspondence of the human soul with the Eternal, takes as many forms as human character itself", keeps the pastor sensitively alert to the idiosyncrasies and peculiar needs of each separate soul with whom he deals. And if the pasture which he provides does not happen to suit the appetite or digestion of some

of his flock he must not let himself be disconcerted or dismayed so long as they find more nourishing herbage in another meadow.

(*f*) "In torment and effort to serve the brethren": this was the "direction" which was given to her in 1924. Eight years later (in *The Golden Sequence*) she expanded that phrase into the words, "Such a vocation in its fulness means much suffering; a bearing of griefs and a carrying of sorrows, an agonized awareness of sadness and sin." And in saying this she uttered the final and fullest word on the pastoral office. Sacrifice is always fruitful; and there is nothing fruitful without it. St Paul had expressed it in his appealing cry: "So then death worketh in us, but life in you." Here, then, perhaps, is the explanation of our futility. The demon is not cast out of the world, or the Church, or our own hearts, because we are not willing to pay the price of its removal: "this kind cometh not forth save by prayer and fasting". Discipleship means discipline; and only the life that bears the marks of the nails evidences the true pastor.

LUMSDEN BARKWAY, BP.

J. M. Ludlow's Criticism of F. D. Maurice's Theology

FOR some time a somewhat wordy debate had taken place between Dr Jelf, the Principal of King's College, and one of his professors on "the word eternal and the punishment of the wicked". The occasion for this controversy was the publication of Maurice's *Theological Essays*. Dr Jelf, however, was not the only person to disapprove of this work. Controversy ended up as something in the nature of a witch hunt. On 27 October 1853, a hundred years ago, a motion was brought forward by the council of the college condemning Maurice's theology as calculated to unsettle the minds of the theological students. From henceforward until 1866, when he was appointed to a chair at Cambridge, Maurice was to be at war with what one might call the accepted conservative theological school of the time. One of his most famous adversaries during this period was Dean Mansel. Mansel's Bampton Lectures, *The Limits of Religious Thought*, aroused Maurice to a vehement attack in a work entitled *What is Revelation?* This controversy revived many of the issues of his previous controversy with Dr Jelf.

Maurice always hated the notion that he was forming a party or surrounding himself with docile disciples who blindly accepted his teaching. Hence, one may suspect, his liking and respect for one of his closest collaborators, John Malcolm Ludlow, his chief of staff in the Christian Socialist movement. Ludlow was a younger man than he was. Like Maurice he had brought the religious intensity of nonconformity into the established Church. As often as not, however, he employed that intensity in urging the man whom he so much admired to approve of views that Maurice could not accept. Up to 1853, Ludlow had been chiefly occupied in trying to persuade Maurice to accept the doctrines of French socialism and act in the manner he expected a French socialist would. Maurice, however, had

become the critic of Ludlow's doctrinairism, translating what he thought of value in Ludlow's views into an idiom that Ludlow could not understand.

However, in the discussions between the two men on Maurice's theological statements, their roles were reversed. In face of what he considered Maurice's theological doctrinairism, Ludlow in portions of an unpublished autobiography and in some unpublished letters became the critic.

Maurice and Ludlow had different talents and belonged to different generations. Maurice was still in strong revolt against the predominant school of eighteenth-century philosophy. This claimed to be based on universally acknowledged principles which it claimed were in fact the premises of all worth-while philosophic discussion. It denied that man possessed any special spiritual insight. The "divine philosophy" to which Milton alluded was in fact a relic of Gothic superstition. There was no need, therefore, for a spiritual society, the Church. There was only one kind of knowledge, the same for all men. The philosopher was merely better equipped intellectually to make logical deductions from universally acknowledge truths.

Maurice, on the contrary, passionately affirmed that man had a spiritual nature and an insight into the things of the spirit. Without an acknowledgement of this spiritual insight, he insisted, even those principles which were universally accepted by the eighteenth century could have no validity for him.

Now Dr Jelf, Dean Mansel, and, we may add, John Ludlow, had essentially eighteenth-century minds. Man's knowledge, they believed, could not extend beyond certain clearly defined limits. Indeed, philosophic agnosticism was the premise for faith in revealed religion. Like Hamlet, they were prepared to acknowledge that there were "more things in heaven and earth than in your philosophy". The philosopher, however, should leave these "more things" alone. The heretic, indeed, was usually some presumptuous thinker, who claimed he saw clearly, where others were aware only of an impenetrable darkness, and tried to impart what he claimed he saw to the docile unquestioning orthodox who, otherwise thoroughly aware of their ignorance, asked only to be told what to believe from some venerable established authority.

To Maurice, on the other hand, a Christian philosopher who claimed that he could not discuss divinity because he had no kind of knowledge of it suitable for philosophic discussion must end up in scepticism and denial. If he denied that his philosophic gifts gave him any capacity to discriminate on things divine, a spiritual vacuum must gradually appear between him and the revelation which he at once accepted, but as a philosopher ignored. If he refused to believe in divine philosophy, he would soon, Maurice believed, become an agent of the devil and express diabolical philosophy. His admirer John Henry Shorthouse declared that Maurice had no understanding of the "agnostic's" position.

Though Maurice considered the philosophy of the eighteenth century insufficient, he did not condemn it completely. The principles

on which it was based, though insufficient, were in fact based on a valid spiritual insight. Eighteenth-century philosophy, however perverse, was based on a genuine reverence for the moral law. Though he insisted on proclaiming the importance of the spiritual society, the Church, Maurice yet admitted that the State, the expression of the rational law backed by compulsion, also received its power directly from God. Both Church and State, he insisted, had their special functions. Both became deformed if either usurped the functions of the other. Nevertheless, Maurice always insisted that he was the man of the spirit, the prophet of the Church.

John Ludlow, on the other hand, was the man of law, the potential statesman. The socialism, indeed, of which he was the persistent advocate, was to some extent the expression of a desire to abandon the limitless indefinable world of the spirit and to return to the external measurable physical solidities beloved by the eighteenth century.

The man of the law, the statesman, and the man of the spirit both have their special temptations. The fault of the philosophy of the eighteenth century was that it either tried to transform divine knowledge into something that could be expressed in its own terms, into a "reasonable Christianity", or, having denied that there was any use in discussing ultimate questions at all, it yet conceded that it was quite possible that something or someone very sinister did lurk in the abysmal darkness which it confessed its own philosophic eye could not penetrate, of whom it would, indeed, be advisable to keep on the right side.

The fault of the spiritual man is to see men not as rational animals. On the contrary he tends to view them as angels. He may see them as about to be translated from a totally evil world, whose earthly character it is a merit to ignore, to dwell with the elect. Or—and this was perhaps Maurice's temptation—put on a pair of Platonic spectacles and see nothing but the angelic in man; see heaven already in fact on earth; identify the world as it is with the Church invisible; see the world as all spirit and no matter, all eternal principles with no temporal accidents.

With this no doubt oversimplified distinction between Maurice, the representative of the spiritual power the Church, and Ludlow of the legal power the State, we may better appreciate Ludlow's comments in his autobiography and in his letters on Maurice's theological controversies.

"I cannot say", he declares in his autobiography in discussing Maurice's controversy with Dr Jelf, "that I have ever been troubled with doubts as to whether the punishment of the wicked was or was not to last for ever without end . . . it is enough for me to know that there is a Heaven and a Hell, a grace and a damnation, a righteousness and unrighteousness which have alike their reward at the hands of a most Righteous Judge." Nevertheless he was prepared to admit that "none but a clergyman can tell how often doubts of this kind fester into sores in minds perhaps morbidly tender or subtle".

Ludlow considers that Maurice perhaps took "too little trouble to stoop—for I must use the word—within the range of his opponent's

vision, to measure the amount of truth which may be contained in Dr Jelf's views, and by taking hold of it, in accordance with his own peculiar method, to find a ground of agreement with him."[1]

However, this criticism did not prevent him from taking practical action in the defence of a friend facing a witch hunt. He planned a series of pamphlets, he tells us, *King's College No. 1—The Facts*, which was actually published anonymously *by a barrister of Lincoln's Inn, March 1854*, and which Archdeacon Hare declared "really stopped the attacks which had been pouring in on Maurice". This pamphlet was to be followed by *No. 2—The Doctrine* and *No. 3—The Man*. "But, on hearing my intention," Ludlow informs us, "Mr Maurice showed himself so absolutely adverse to No. 3 that I was obliged to give up No. 2 also."[2]

However, when Maurice again entered the fray against Dean Mansel, Ludlow became more strongly critical. There was one passage of Mansel's lectures in particular which filled Maurice with horror. "*As if the whole mystery of iniquity were contained in the words 'for ever'!" "The real riddle of Existence—the problem which confounds all philosophy—and all religion too, so far as religion is a thing of man's reason—is the fact that evil exists at all; not that it lasts for a longer or a shorter duration. Is not God infinitely wise and holy and powerful now? And does not sin exist along with that infinite holiness and wisdom and power?* Is God to become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter; and must evil be annihilated to make room for his perfections to expand? Does the infinity of his eternal nature ebb and flow with every increase or diminution in the sum of human guilt and misery? Against this immovable barrier of the existence of evil, the waves of philosophy have dashed themselves unceasingly since the birthday of human thought and have retired broken and powerless without displacing the minutest fragment of the stubborn rock, without softening one feature of its dark and rugged surface."[3]

Maurice declared that this passage was "nearly the most tremendous I ever read in a Christian writer. I was beginning to comment on these words. I was trying to tell you what impression they made on me. I can only say if they are true, let us tell our countrymen that the agony and bloody sweat of Christ, his cross and passion, his death and burial, his Resurrection and Ascension were nothing. We shall not stop at Mr Mansel's point, but we shall be certain that evil must run for ever and ever, must drive out all that is opposed to it. We shall praise thee, O devil, we shall acknowledge thee to be the Lord."[4]

Ludlow's attitude to Maurice may be described as that of an ancient retainer toward his master. He could not move in the world of the master he served, but he did on occasions feel uneasy about his master's behaviour. He would then quote sayings of his ancestors or critical gossip he had picked up while clearing up in the smoking

[1] John Ludlow's Autobiography, chapter xxxii—Mr Maurice's King's College Difficulties.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Quoted in *What is Revelation?*, p. 435.
[4] Ibid., p. 436.

room. When Ludlow does try to argue theologically he often becomes heavy-handed, inept, and verbose.

What is Revelation? roused him to write two long, critical letters to Maurice. "Crushing" as Maurice's book was "for the most part", it was too long, and the more triumphant Maurice was, the more necessary it was for those who in the main agreed with him to avow where they did not.

Ludlow disliked the rhetorical style of the offending paragraph of the Bampton lectures, but the italicized sentences at any rate did express what appeared to him to be the truth. "What nothing in your present book, nothing in any former one, nothing I have ever heard you say, seemed to me to reach in the least; what I know is held as truth by some of the best and wisest men I know, including at least one intimate friend of your own."

"'I am that I am'—and evil is," was for Ludlow the *crux*, which was not in the slightest degree taken away by substituting ". . . 'and evil was conquered' or 'that evil will cease to be'. And feeling this I am not in the slightest degree disposed to burn my Bible or to tell anyone to believe that Christ's agony and ascension mean nothing." Maurice was, Ludlow felt, "most intolerant precisely where I have always felt you are weakest".

Ludlow took refuge in Dr Arnold's "noble observation" that the problem of evil was "one of those confessed unconquerable difficulties" before which "the mind rests as before an established truth". It had been observed to him, Ludlow declared, "years ago" that amidst all Maurice's "efforts to rescue the idea of God and God's eternity from considerations of time" he in reality brought it back into those conditions by insisting so much on a final triumph over evil. God had not answered Job by assuring him of a final triumph. Ludlow also condemned Maurice's use of the expression "eternal death" as unscriptural.[1]

Maurice's reply was at once more eloquent, more imaginative and dramatic than the letter of the critical Ludlow. It was an uncompromising criticism of Ludlow's views though full of implied respect for his character. He did not, he explained, differ from Ludlow about the existence of evil being "the great *crux* of all . . . the unintelligible thing, that the attempt to reduce it to a law or principle is to commit a contradiction". That was not the question at all. "It is whether the unintelligibility of evil or the omnipotence of God is a reason for not regarding him as carrying on a war against evil and for not expecting that in that war evil will be vanquished." Maurice attacked "Mr Mansel's Carlton Club, Oxford Common room yarn ''Pon my soul, I can't see why evil should not last for ever if it exists now'." Evil to Mansel was "a notion". It was not a notion to Ludlow. "You feel you must fight it to the death. And if you do not frankly confess, what in your heart you believe, that God is fighting against it, you will be obliged to feel that you are fighting against him. Your attempt to escape this doctrine, which goes through the

[1] Ludlow-Maurice letters: des Graz collection.

whole Bible—that being nothing else than the book of the wars of the Lord—convinces me that I am right in the strong language I used and that there is a scepticism in all our hearts—I am sure there is a deep scepticism in mine—on the subject which can only be removed by earnestly thinking what the agony and bloody sweat of Christ must mean, whether this was not the battle of God with that which is resisting his nature."[1] Maurice also defended his use of the words "eternal death".

This answer, however, failed to satisfy Ludlow. "Let me observe", he replied (15 and 16 July 1859), "that I am not discussing with you. The question at issue is one entirely as it seems to me beyond discussion. All I ask is that you should not visit with hard words, as apparently a tremendous sin, the statement of an intellectual puzzle which others simply accept as such, and in which they do not expect to be helped by anything you say and, therefore, deem it the wiser course to leave it on one side." Ludlow disclaimed "the bribe you hold to the Pharisee within me of separating myself practically from" Dr Mansel. "I adopt his words; it is not for me to determine how far he is sincere in them." Ludlow insisted that he *did* believe God was fighting against evil. "But that faith does not help me the smallest degree in my puzzle. . . . It is only when one has brought the deepest of spiritual truths face to face with the impotency of the intellect to deal with it that one feels the deep beauty of the cry: '*Credo quia impossibile, quia absurdum*'. And that is why the attempt to rationalize the primordial absurdity of the fight by the expedient of a future triumph appears to me—allow me the word—so feeble. . . . One of your most out and out admirers once said to me—and I was much surprised at having the thought from his lips—'I am not afraid of Maurice's views not gaining ground: what I am afraid of is that twenty years hence they will form a new orthodoxy and that men will not be allowed to speak or think against them.' It is precisely *this* which I fear in your denunciation of Mansel both in your book and in your letter to me."

Ludlow could not refrain, however, from himself offering a solution to the *crux*. Scripture, he believed, pointed to neither everlasting punishment nor final restoration of the wicked but simply to their destruction. "Of course this is just as absurd as anything else, but I think it is written." (Was Ludlow, the doctrinaire socialist, contemplating an angelic secret police complete with celestial gas chamber?)

"If you still know that anonymous disciple of mine," Maurice replied (18 July 1859), "or if he has not himself changed into something of the most opposite kind, I wish you would assure him that his fear that the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Convocation of Clergy should declare me to be the standard of orthodoxy . . . has not any immediate prospect of fulfilment."[2] Maurice believed, however, that what he called "Tartarean Christianity" was gaining

[1] See *Life of F. D. Maurice*, Vol. II, pp. 347 f.
[2] Ludlow-Maurice letters: des Graz collection.

ground and that Mansel was a manifestation of a similar tendency at Oxford to Spurgeon in London.

Both Maurice and Ludlow were insistent that a certain philosophic viewpoint implied a particular kind of political and ethical action. One cannot say that one of these two views is typically "conservative", the other typically "progressive". This depends upon time and circumstance. During the eighteenth century, the injunction

> Know then thyself: presume not God to scan.
> The proper study of mankind is man.

appeared new, almost revolutionary. During the nineteenth century a similar injunction could be used to preserve the established order against "unsettling" spiritual movements. To Ludlow, however, Maurice seemed on occasions only to preach of a spiritual warfare against unseen principalities and powers and to shirk undertaking the practical measures which alone could improve the material conditions of the British working class. The "progressives" of the nineteenth and early twentieth century often took up a similar position to Maurice, overestimating their spiritual power and becoming more and more contemptuous of State compulsion and physical force. The present generation of pessimistic, realistic political thinkers and historians, even when they are defenders of the faith, is more akin to Ludlow. The wheel has come full circle. Neither statesman nor churchmen are on the side of the angels, but rather insist that they have no knowledge of such celestial beings. Such a change of opinion may well cause us again to ponder Maurice's criticism of the Whig conservative Mansel and the socialist Ludlow.

N. C. Masterman.

The Churches and "McCarthyism"

It falls within the province of theology to analyse the deeper significance of social developments by placing them in a perspective where they can be understood in the light of the Christian understanding of history. The usual result of such an undertaking is the discovery of the judgment of God upon the arrogance of man in very sharp tones. Any proclamation of God's redemption with reference to particular social developments must be most guarded.

The phenomenon, called "McCarthyism", in the modern American scene, although it has existed down through history in slightly different forms and under many different names, must be looked at not simply in terms of our immediate political and economic fears, but also in terms of its significance theologically speaking. Historically the emergence of such a phenomenon raises a question of what is basic loyalty and where is it to be directed? It was so in the days of the Gracchi and of Marius and Sulla. It is so to-day. The question of loyalty leads to social division, not along clear-cut lines, but rather to a period of shifting loyalties in which rival groups demand much without ever being able to tell what they receive.

Such divisions cut across most established groupings within the

body politic. They cut across political parties and religious organizations. It is commonplace to point out that the leadership of the Christian Church is usually way ahead of the rank and file in intellectual understanding and insight regarding the issues of the day. The problem now is whether or not a gulf exists which prevents creative contact from taking place. As Baron von Hügel said, the philosopher and the charwoman must be able to find a common centre for their devotion. To-day it is the reality of this common centre which is being tested. Does it exist or not?

As long as the rank and file of American Christians trusted their leadership in general, if not always in particular, their lack of understanding of many issues and outright resistance on some acted more as a brake than as a deterrent. As I have previously pointed out in THEOLOGY, the effect sometimes has been to find the Churches ostensibly committed to positions about which most of their lay members know little, and where they are fairly often of a contrary mind on the level of their ordinary practice. Then the question arises whether any action on social questions by the leadership of the Churches really commits the Church to anything at all. But up to the present it did not prevent courageous men from speaking out on issues where they felt concerned, with the assurance that their convictions were rooted in a Christian faith essentially shared by the community at large, and that their actions did not cut them off from fellowship in the deepest sense.

The question raised by "McCarthyism", looked at first as a social phenomenon rather than simply the result of the program of one man, is whether it really cuts between the leadership of the Churches and the rank and file so as to lead to serious confusion. If it does, it then raises the question: What is the primary loyalty of the people so affected and where is it really directed? If "McCarthyism", which is essentially a nationalistic-reactionary movement on the level of political economy, can cut between the leadership and the rank and file of the Churches, it suggests that perhaps the Christian Church was not really the "faith" of those who have been cut off. Some other loyalty—America or the "American way of life" or just the maintenance of a particular kind of self-contained security—may prove to be the strongest religious force affecting the behaviour of many Americans.

At the present there appears to be a residual strength in American Protestantism (non-Roman American Christendom) which has considerable power, real though undefined, once it seems to be attacked as such. But this power does not seem to be very well directed when it comes to relating the Christian insight to issues in detail. It can react to a threat to American Protestantism *en masse*, but it becomes a little less effective in the defence of even leading American Protestants, and rather vague on the level of ordinary men and women caught in the ambiguities of a confusing situation. In any event the Churches of America are in a time of testing.

The issue calling for leadership now is complicated by the fact that several threads are woven into the design. The American public

is aware that Russia is the major rival to world peace as it is conceived in this country. It is also aware that Communism is the Russian system, not only for interpreting Russian policy to Russians, but also as a means of advancing Russian policy in other countries. It has been told how Communism has weakened the ability of other countries to resist being drawn into the Russian orbit. And it feels that there is some kind of a domestic Communist threat of serious proportions here, the nature of which is hard to describe.

What is called "McCarthyism" is a method of combating the Communist threat, real or alleged, by discrediting people who are tinged with Communist sympathy or associations. There is no doubt that quite a number of younger intellectuals in the days of the "depression" in the 1930s flirted with Communism as such, and there is no doubt that some who never repented of this association found places for themselves in government service and in the world of education. But it is one thing to ferret out actual disloyalty in places of responsibility, and another to discredit the loyalty and usefulness of individuals who were once fairly to the left but who now stand in the general liberal wing of the Democratic party. "McCarthyism" is the name given to smearing people for their past connexions.

"McCarthyism" got its foothold in Congress in two ways—1. by picking up the tradition of the old House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, originally led by former Representative Martin Dies of Texas, which has been largely used as a weapon of political reaction against any kind of leftist power in the Labour movement; and 2. the desire of many Republicans to throw out the Democratic party from office regardless of the means. There is no doubt that the Truman administration had been somewhat lax in its personnel policies, but hardly enough to cause such strenuous corrective measures. But as a political weapon the measures were useful. They made many voters think that Stalin had confidential agents in every Government department, because of the laxity, inefficiency, and venality of the Administration.

These various threads exist in a framework of world tension, which tends to make many people jumpy. The case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg is in point. They were tried and convicted of a crime, but the execution seemed to suggest all sorts of ramifications. To those frightened of world Communism, any clemency shown by this country would be a sign of weakness in the face of world Communism. When Justice Douglas granted a stay of execution in order that certain points of law might be more adequately examined, he was vilified by many people and one Congressman introduced a resolution of impeachment (since thrown out). The reference to the Rosenberg affair is to illustrate the emotional climate in which problems have to be faced and dealt with.

The Congressional committees, of which there are several—Senator McCarthy's committee on investigations, Senator Jenner's of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, and Representative Velde's old House Committee on Un-American Activities—have kept on more aggressively than ever after the election. The work done by Senator

McCarthy's group in the cases of the nomination of Ambassador Bohlen and in the "Voice of America" and the libraries is already known abroad. The other committees have been concerned with alleged Red infiltration into American education. What appears to be part of the objective is to discredit as far as possible those socially liberal forces which often provide the moral dynamic for the Democratic party in an election year, so as to ensure Republican control in the Congressional elections of 1954. Along with this objective is the desire of many leaders in American business to call a halt to the social legislation of the New Deal and Fair Deal type, partly by challenging the loyalty of advocates of economic reform.

It takes far-sighted leadership to disentangle the threads, so that other people can see what they are. Some leaders of the American Churches are trying to do just this job of helping the rank and file of the people to distinguish between the true and false in the Communist menace, and to recognize "McCarthyism" for what it is and what it does to the moral health of the country.

American "anti-Communism" threatens to become more of a touchstone of orthodoxy for many people than the Creeds, the Sacraments, and the traditions of the Christian Church. But the issue has not been decided, and there is a tremendous weight of traditional popular opinion on the side of the Churches which will not permit of blanket criticism. Thus President Eisenhower, who has avoided many problems where many thought he should have taken a stand, was moved to act in the case of Mr J. B. Matthews, who had been appointed Chief Investigator for his sub-committee by Senator Joseph McCarthy.

As is probably known in England, Mr Matthews, who was formerly Chief Investigator for the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, published an article in a monthly magazine, *The American Mercury*, saying that the Protestant Churches were among the main centres for Communist influence in America and that he had a list of several thousand prominent Protestant clergymen who were so inclined. Under fire by newspaper reporters, Mr Matthews later said that his article had only been about Protestant clergymen but that he could do the same thing for Roman Catholic and Jewish.

The article itself, which was a review of many organizations, associated largely by being mentioned in the same article, included a good many bishops of the Episcopal Church who have been interested in movements for world peace. Actually some of the men charged were engaged in pacifist activity in the middle 1930s and earlier, and a good many have retired long since from the active ministry. The article then mentioned the social action branches, wings, or informal committees of the various denominations, where some leaders have taken a position fairly close to the "Party Line." There were doubtless people mentioned in Mr Matthews' article who were guilty as charged, but they were lumped together with a group many times as large who were completely beyond serious reproach for questionable political activity.

The reason that the Matthews affair is mentioned at such length is for its symptomatic significance. Matthews himself is one of a number of disgruntled former social liberals who have become professional anti-Communists, and aside from his sponsorship he is not a person to be taken too seriously. It is significant that he has found continual employment over the past decade by prominently placed conservative and reactionary groups, and a good part of the time he has been in the employ of committees of the United States Congress.

When the *American Mercury* article appeared, there was a furore throughout the country—against Mr Matthews and the committee. A majority of the committee insisted on his resignation. Senator McCarthy refused to accept the resignation, saying that he, as chairman, was solely responsible for the personnel of the investigation staff. Then President Eisenhower made his statement to the press defending the clergy as a group from blanket charges, and the Senator backed down and Mr Matthews left the employ.

As a matter of fact what is called "McCarthyism" is an issue bigger than Senator McCarthy and his particular committee. It involves also another committee of the Senate, headed by Senator Jenner of Indiana, and the old House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, headed by Representative Velde of Illinois. These two groups have actually done more sniping at the Churches than the McCarthy committee, and it is true that Senator McCarthy stated at the time of the Matthews affair that his group had no intention of investigating the Churches—the furore being caused by the article and the employment of Mr Matthews, rather than anything the committee was doing.

This matter has been described in greater detail than it deserves because it does point up a rather basic issue in the life of American Christendom. The reaction came when American Protestantism as a whole appeared to be under fire, and President Eisenhower certainly acted to defend the Churches from a sweeping accusation. The President's action came, however, after a long series of incidents.

In the House Committee, Representative Jackson of California had stated, under Congressional immunity which saves him from a charge of libel, that Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam worked for the Church on Sundays and for the Communists the other six days. A tremendous wave of indignation arose after this attack on Bishop Oxnam, who is one of the outstanding leaders of American Protestantism and had been President of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

Representative Jackson said he had a file on Bishop Oxnam, and finally when some information was secured from him it turned out to be a list of broad-scale national movements in which people of many different points of view had been engaged. It also turned out that the Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, Dr Henry Knox Sherrill, had been in some of the same movements and had been mentioned by name in the representative's documents. The situation now turned ridiculous, and Bishop Oxnam has insisted upon being allowed to appear personally before the committee.

There are many reasons why these affairs might have occurred, taken on the level of detail only. There is, for instance, an organization of American fundamentalists calling itself the American Council of Christian Churches, headed by an unfrocked Presbyterian minister, Dr Carl McIntyre, which seems to find it possible to use the anti-Communist temper of the country to impugn the integrity of the major Christian groups, and gets listened to by some otherwise fairly responsible groups as if this council really represented something.

Behind all this, however, is the fact that the wave of anti-Communist thought, in many places approaching hysteria, has run into its first militant opposition in the Churches. It had encountered political opposition from the Americans for the Democratic Action wing of the Democratic party, but the struggle in this area appeared to be a matter of politics to people not too close to it. It has run into some opposition in the colleges and universities which have also been under attack, but while individual professors have acted with resolution and courage to defend fellow faculty-members believed to be unfairly attacked, the academic community does not in itself mould popular opinion too quickly in this country.

The Churches, however, have acted, and continue to act—and then the question arises again whether the gulf between the leadership and the rank and file will partially or completely nullify the action, or be bridged by an aroused common mind. At the General Conventino of the Episcopal Church in September 1952, the bishops passed a strong resolution calling for fairness and fidelity in conducting Congressional investigations. The House of Deputies did not concur in this resolution, but made it plain that its action was based upon a feeling that the matter was not germane to a church assembly and the vote did not constitute "an endorsement of any political figure of national prominence". The entire Convention did pass a resolution stating that the members of the Episcopal Church should "use every reasonable means to overcome long-standing discriminatory practices in our own land, and particularly, in these days when we seek to oppose the threat of totalitarianism from without, to guard against our own use of the methods we condemn in others".

Many of the bishops and clergy of the Episcopal Church have taken a public stand on the subject of indiscriminate use of the power of Congress to investigate, and particularly the assassination of the character of individuals by guilt through association. This indictment for guilt through association has had a very damaging effect in many universities and colleges, where the summons to appear before one of the committees has itself appeared to impugn the loyalty and responsibility of the witness. It is to the credit of the American Churches that so many leaders have taken so strong and so public a stand.

The gulf exists. The resolution on fidelity in Congressional investigations in which the House of Deputies did not concur was defeated largely by the lay deputies present. The bishops had passed it, and most of the clergy seemed to be in favour. There is reason to

believe that some of the laymen who opposed the resolution felt that passage in September 1952 would tend to throw the influence of the Episcopal Church against Senator McCarthy in the Wisconsin election in November, and might in some way reflect against the Republican national ticket. While such immediate fears were obviously uppermost, the action does suggest that the leadership of the Church has a job to do with the rank and file at the same time that it takes public stands on social questions.

When American Protestantism is attacked *en bloc*, it apparently has enough traditional weight in American society to crush by reaction the attacker without any particular leadership being necessary. But it is another thing when even responsible individuals like Bishop Oxnam are attacked. Here the support from various informed quarters helped to build up the climate which sustained the bishop. He could not count on presidential intervention to be the automatic result of a shot at his head.

The present situation seems to indicate that the reactionary wing in American business has somehow become even more seriously involved in its continual attempt to make the Christian Churches serve its creeds and cults of economic orthodoxy. Now it is apparently in league with the anti-Communist crusaders of the Congress. Three years ago, a book by another disgruntled liberal, Mr John T. Flynn, entitled *The Road Ahead*, was widely circulated by business leaders. This book, the author of which broke with the late President Roosevelt in his first administration and then became very sour on all that the New Deal stood for, to say nothing of going further to the Left, purported to point out the Communist infiltration into all kinds of social movements in America. It included a chapter on the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (now the National Council of the Churches of Christ in America), the information for which was supplied by Dr McIntyre, referred to above. The Flynn book drew an answer in a booklet supporting the Council which appeared over the signatures of a number of very prominent American business men who serve as lay members on it, but it has continued to be circulated. The tone of recent Congressional investigation seems to echo the Flynn book.

The real question now, then, is: Which represents the thinking of the American public—the mood now dominant in Congress or that represented by the spokesmen for the Churches who have criticized the way the investigations have been handled? In one sense, of course, this question cannot be given an accurate answer, not mathematically or statistically, but it must be given a living answer in the days ahead.

Perhaps the rising tide of anti-Communist hysteria in America may give the Churches a unique opportunity to proclaim the Christian Gospel in relevant terms in such a way as to help this country rediscover its soul.

CHARLES D. KEAN.

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

Fr Bedale is quite right to draw attention to an exaggerated phrase in my article of last February when I referred to "the mistaken idea that a Godward reference is implied in the word" remembrance. Of course it can apply to God's remembrance as well as man's. Indeed I implied as much in the sentence previous to that which Fr Bedale quotes (not quite accurately). I should have done better if I had written "necessarily implied", as it was against such a view that I was protesting.

The view that the Eucharist is a memorial offering seems to hinge on the LXX version of Lev. 24. 7, the only passage where *ἀνάμνησις* appears to translate the Hebrew *azkarah* which was regularly used of the incense burnt as a memorial before God of a cereal offering, and elsewhere translated *μνημόσυνον*. Fr Bedale has argued that *ἀνάμνησις* here is the equivalent of *azkarah*. If so, the LXX will mean "they shall be bread for an *azkarah*". But this would be the opposite of every other O.T. instance of *azkarah*, where the cereal offering is not itself an *azkarah* but has to have one. It is thefore very unlikely that the equation *ἀνάμνησις* equals *azkarah* will stand here. In Num. 10. 10 the remembrance admittedly is God's. But it is not the sacrifice but the blowing of trumpets, according to the LXX, that is a remembrance. The difficulty of interpreting the titles of the Psalms is notorious. Certainly they can hardly serve as evidence either way for a disputed meaning of a word.

There is one further LXX instance of *ἀνάμνησις* to which Fr Bedale has not drawn attention, in Wisd. 16. 6. "For admonition were they troubled for a short space . . . to put them in remembrance (*εἰς ἀνάμνησιν*) of thy law." In view of this it is difficult to see how Fr Bedale can argue "the word *ἀνάμνησις* on each occasion of its use in the LXX has exclusively a Godward reference" or that it "is definitely a ritual and liturgical term". A more accurate summary of the evidence would seem to be that *ἀνάμνησις* is most unlikely to mean an *azkarah*, a memorial-offering, but has its ordinary meaning of an act of recalling or remembrance without determining to whom the recall is made. It may be to God (as in Num. 10. 10) or to man (as in Wisd. 16. 6), according to the context.

Fr Bedale has also quoted Heb. 10. 3. "In those sacrifices there is a yearly remembrance of sins", as if it supported a Godward interpretation for *ἀνάμνησις* in the N.T. But the reference here must be to the worshipper's remembrance, not God's, both on the general ground that when God remembers sin he punishes it, and on the particular ground that in this passage the opposite of *ἀνάμνησις ἁμαρτιῶν* is "no more conscience of sins" (10. 2). This is clearly the worshipper's conscience and picks up the thought of 9. 9, "sacrifices that cannot, as touching the conscience, make the worshipper perfect". That the sacrifices are probably those of the day of Atonement, as Fr Bedale argues, would seem to have little bearing on the right interpretation of *ἀνάμνησις* here.

We can now come to use of *ἀνάμνησις* in the words of institution. There need be no dispute about Fr Bedale's point that "the whole context consists of sacrificial terms". How could it be otherwise when the rite is concerned with the sacrifice of our Lord? The point at issue is whether the purpose of the rite is to recall the sacrifice to God's remembrance or to man's. That St Paul understood it in the latter sense is clear. For after the words "do this as oft as ye drink it in remembrance of me" he immediately adds, "For as oft as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come" (1 Cor. 11. 25–6). The connecting particle "for" makes it clear that the latter verse is added to explain the words immediately preceding. *Καταγγέλλειν,* as I showed in my original article, must mean "proclaim to man", and it is an interesting point that this verb is "the exact equivalent of the Hebrew *higgidh*" (the verb used for "show" in Ex. 13. 8: "Thou shalt show thy son in that day, saying, This [i.e. the Passover] is done because of that which the Lord did unto me when I came forth out of Egypt"), and suggests that at the Eucharist there was "a recitation of the story of the death of the Lord . . . corresponding exactly to the Haggadah at the Jewish Paschal meal, the recitation of the act of redemption from Egypt."[1]

I also drew attention to the fact that the liturgies understand the words of institution to mean a remembrance by man. The patristic use of *ἀνάμνησις* seems to accord with this. Clement of Rome, for example (1 Clem. 53. 1), says that his readers know the Scriptures. Therefore he only writes "*πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν*", "to remind you", as Kirsopp Lake translates. Methodius twice writes of baptism as an *ἀνάμνησις* of the Passion (Symp. 3. 8 and 8. 6). Eusebius writes of those who observe the commemoration (*τὴν ἀνάμνησιν ποιούμενοι*) of the Passion by fasting on Fridays (Pasch. 12) or of Sunday as the *ἀνάμνησις* of the Lord (Al. serm.). Or again Gregory of Nyssa says, with reference to a pagan New Year festival, "*οἱ ὁπλῖται τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀνάμνησιν τοῦ ἔτους ποιοῦντται*". In the light of such examples as these it will be evident that *ἀνάμνησις* was understood by the fathers to mean recol-

[1] Buchanan Gray, *Sacrifice in the Old Testament*, p. 395. Cf. W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, p. 252.

lection, reminding, commemoration, and that *ἀνάμνησιν ποιεῖν* is not a technical term for re-presentation before God, as has sometimes been suggested, but means rather to observe a commemoration.

But my case does not stand or fall with the meaning of *ἀνάμνησιν*. For recent Biblical studies have made it clear that God's remembrance means nothing more nor less than that God is taking action. When God remembers mercy (Luke 1. 54) he helps his servant Israel. Even if it should be proved that in the Eucharist it is God who remembers, it would mean nothing more nor less than that in it God acts to work out in us what our Lord has done for us. The interpretation which makes the Eucharist a reminder to God in any other sense has still to answer John Knox's question. "Is there any oblivion or forgetfulness fallen on God the Father? Hath he forgotten the death and passion of Jesus Christ, so that he need to be brought in memory thereof by any mortal man?"[1]

In his last and interpretative paragraph (with much of which I agree) Fr Bedale wrote that our Lord "offered and offers" his manhood to God. Whence does he derive the idea that our Lord's sacrifice continues? Nothing in his article seems to lead up to it, and I have yet to be shown any passage in the New Testament which demands such an interpretation. This is still the point at issue between Canon Balmforth and myself. I notice that his rejoinder published in your July number does not reply to my question, "Is there any place in Scripture where our Lord's sacrifice for sin is spoken of as now continuing?" He evidently regards such a question as irrelevant and concerned with what is only a convenient verbal distinction on the ground that "the sacrificial humanity is not shed at the Resurrection but taken up into the mystery of the divine being." But when Canon Balmforth speaks of sacrificial humanity, does he only mean "humanity that has been sacrificed"? If so, he has not proved his point. Or does he include in his meaning "humanity that is even now being sacrificed"? In this case he has again assumed in his argument the point he seeks to prove, and his thought has departed from the Biblical way of putting things.

Whatever explanation we adopt of the relationship between our Lord's atoning work and the eternal character of God, it must give due weight to the element of once-for-allness that characterizes the Biblical references to the atonement. The results of this once-for-all event are indeed continuous, both through the continuous work of the Holy Spirit and because our Lord remains the "lamb as it had been slain" (Rev. 5. 6). I am therefore at one with Canon Balmforth in the belief that the Christian cannot come to God apart from Christ. He expresses this by saying that "the Saviour and the saved go together to the Father". But it seems to me nearer to the Biblical perspective to say that we come to the Father through and in Christ rather than with him, that he brings us to the Father, gives us access to him and a share in his own relationship with him. In fact the emphasis is on the Christian's dependence on his Saviour at every

[1] Quoted by Lord Eustace Percy, *John Knox*, p. 137.

point. On some such way of thinking about the Christian life, so it seems to me, the Christian's παρρησία, joy and confidence largely depend. These, of course, are not the only qualities of the Christian character as the New Testament depicts it, but they are an essential part of the picture. While differences of terminology probably conceal a larger measure of agreement than appears on the surface, I believe it to be of great importance that we should try to see things from the Biblical perspective, and I am concerned lest Canon Balmforth's way of putting things should ultimately be found to leave no room for these qualities.

Yours faithfully,

W. M. F. Scott.

St Aidan's College,
Birkenhead.

"NOVELIST OF DAMNATION"

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

Your contributor Mr A. D. S. Fowler in your July number writes on p. 260: "If literature is to be a true study of men, it must study men as they are." He implies in his article that the literature of Mr Graham Greene is such a true study.

Mr Fowler writes further, on p. 261, of "evil in Mr Greene's world". That world I believe to be so far from being God's world that it radically invalidates much of Mr Greene's study of men.

Your contributor writes also (p. 260) of the fascination of Mr Greene's plot-making. I would agree with him in accounting his subject "one of the most brilliant makers of plot in the history of the novel", but that is just the trouble: one is so fascinated that one loses sight of the fact that the world of Mr Greene is often no more real than the world of Mr Edgar Allan Poe. The "net of events" always closes, and the "knotted plot" always tightens with fascinating brilliance, but the net and the knotting are of the evil of Mr Greene's world, which is not, fortunately, a true study of God's, except only in his masterpiece *The Power and the Glory*.

Yours, etc.,

Austin Masters, S.S.M.

St Francis' Priory,
Kroonstad, O.F.S.,
S. Africa.

UNIVERSITY MISSIONS

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

Your August editorial prompts me to make the following points.

First, to go from the particular example of University Missions to the general principle, which to my mind is the supposition that once a new technique or idea has been successful on a few occasions, it therefore becomes part of the accepted structure of things without

further critical examination. One need not look far for examples in the church—Sunday schools, harvest festivals, the general Sunday set-up, and so on.

Secondly, it seems to me that by means of organized events such as University Missions, those who succeed in attracting the most popular celebrities (as one might say) to lead the mission are often tempted to draw the wrong kind of attention to the success of their enterprise. I feel that, as with parochial life, the best work of university chaplains and the like is much less obtrusive.

Yours, etc.,

C. St M. B. MacFarlane.

Pentrobin Parsonage,
Penyffordd,
Chester.

FAITH AND SCIENCE

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

I should like to protest, as vigorously and as insistently as possible, against the contentions dogmatically advanced by Dr Oldham as the basis of the article which he contributes to your July number. In the course of the article Dr Oldham writes:

> If the Christian faith is to be commended to the modern world, there must be Christian thinkers who acquire the technical equipment of talking the language of science, which is the language of the majority of educated people to-day. . . . In taking charge of his own destiny through the new powers with which science and technology have invested him man has reached adulthood. . . . Because Heim sees so clearly the influence of science on the whole lives of men to-day and the extent to which it has moulded the intellectual face of the age, it is plain to him that if the Christian faith is to obtain a hearing it must come to terms with this tremendous force.

Little reflection should be required in order to understand that what I quote is arrant and pernicious nonsense. I have included the grandiloquent Comtist echo about "destiny" and "adulthood" so as to leave no doubt of the quality of the thinking. I should have imagined that all the statement was unseemly in the mouth of a Christian speaker. But what ought to fill every churchman with dismay and foreboding is rather the categorical demand that "the Christian faith" "must come to terms with science" and that Christian teachers need (above all) the ability to talk "the language of science".

That is, I feel, a demand on all fours with the one frequently heard at the present time, that all books, no matter how recondite their subject, shall be written in words of one syllable, so as to be intelligible to the secondary modern product, who, incidentally, will never as much as try to read a single one of them. It recalls the delusion of the seventeenth-century Jesuit in China, that, if only he taught the Emperor mathematics, the country would be won for Christ. The Son of Heaven grew so deeply interested in mathematics that teacher and pupil never got on to the topic of Christianity, and to-day China is, we hear, as far as ever from being Christian.

The thing to wedge into one's head about science is that, notwithstanding the academic interest recently manifested in this country concerning "the philosophy of science", science has no need of philosophy, and hence no need of theology either. She is like China there.

Before the fair lady Theologia yields to these insidious proposals of Dr Oldham's, made under the shelter of Karl Heim, let her ponder the fate of her sister Philosophia. Why—at least as regards England—is Philosophia now reduced to drooling by herself in a corner over some kind of intricate, tedious, and trifling form of verbal tiddliwinks? Solely as the long-term consequence of an unhappy infatuation with Science. Not only unhappy, but, alas! incestuous. For, agamously or by parthenogenesis, Science came into being out of Philosophy. Very quickly she showed that independence which she continues to flaunt to-day. But no sooner was Science able to get on alone than she achieved the first few of her many marvellous triumphs. Fatally misled by them, and simultaneously baffled by the evasiveness of the subject-matter in other directions of inquiry, mother thereupon began ravening on daughter, and went on ravening till lately consigned to her solitary corner. It is a solemn warning. Unless Theologia hankers after an institutional old age, she will refuse to heed Dr Oldham at all costs. Her prosperity and happiness lie elsewhere.

The fact is that in engendering Science by asexual fission Philosophy was infected with the puerperal disease called Epistemology, from which she has never recovered. To enumerate its ravages would take too long, but the successive complications are significant. If only Malebranche, for instance, had resisted the lure of the psycho-physical problem, or Berkeley had bothered as little as the Dublin celebrants of the bi-centenary of his death this summer about optics and about oars that turn crooked when partly immersed in water, or Kant had not been impelled to decide that the sun is made of coal, or Bergson had refrained from refuting the uncollected Mr Bain, how prosperous and happy Philosophy might be at this moment!

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

WESTWOOD HOUSE,
PETERBOROUGH,
NORTHANTS.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE INTERPRETER'S BIBLE, Vol. 1. General and Old Testament Articles, Genesis and Exodus. Nelson. 67s. 6d.

This is the first of a series of twelve volumes on the Bible which is being prepared with the collaboration of 146 scholars "drawn from all the larger Protestant groups" of the U.S.A. and Britain. The aim of the editors is to produce a comprehensive commentary which will bridge the gulf between exegesis and exposition for preaching and teaching purposes. Our volume contains general articles on the Bible and on the Old Testament, and introduction, exegesis, and exposi-

tion of Genesis and Exodus by scholars who inspire confidence and include W. F. Albright, T. H. Robinson, N. H. Snaith, C. A. Simpson, R. H. Pfeiffer, E. G. Wright, and others.

The general articles render a real service in bringing together in a relatively small space some important results of recent scholarship, particularly in the field of Old Testament studies. In this respect the articles by Samuel Terrien and N. H. Snaith may be singled out as typical. Dealing with the interpretation of the Bible in the modern period, Terrien traces the history of the rise of Biblical criticism which found its final expression in the Graf-Wellhausen school of Old Testament criticism, and shows how the form critical method of study introduced by Gunkel and developed by Gressmann and Jeremias had already indicated some of the gaps in the evolutionary theory which had been developed on the strength of documentary evidence alone and the Hegelian philosophy of history. In showing how a later re-examination of the "Yahwist" document by Gerhard von Rad has suggested a modification of the Graf-Wellhausen reconstruction of Israel's religion, and how this has pushed the essence of Israel's faith back beyond the prophets to an earlier tradition which the prophets themselves inherited, Terrien is doing a real service for those for whom the series is meant. He is making known what is still too little known in the English-speaking world, namely the right reasons for the present interest in the theology of the Old Testament over against the history of the religion of Israel. This has been the setting in which ordinands and teachers have been and, often, still are trained in the Old Testament. A reorientation of Old Testament study is a crying need of our theological and training colleges. In this article the reader sees how scholarship itself, and not only pastoral needs, is calling for a theology of the Old Testament.

The article by N. H. Snaith on the "Language of the Old Testament" puts the results of research in this subject also in a form which will be both intelligible and useful to the educated reader who has little knowledge of Hebrew or Greek. His treatment of the main motif of words and his description of the modern recovery of Hebrew words, together with his justification of the interpretation of the religious words of the New Testament against their Hebrew background in the LXX, will confirm the intelligent reader in thinking that the distinctive message of the Bible is not to be attained by reading it in length, as Wellhausen did, but by reading it in depth. To be taken down into the depths of the Bible is one of the blessings for which those who have hitherto thought only in liberal and progressive terms are likely to be most thankful.

Terrien and Snaith are typical in their contributions of what many others have done in theirs, and in the exegesis and exposition which follow, these things enter into the interpretation of the text. Many of the more recent results of study in the various fields are noted there. The printing of the Revised Standard Version side by side with the Authorized Version over the exegesis and exposition is a great help to the reader and not least when reference is made to variations. The exegesis is well done, but no doubt some will feel

that the exposition is not all it should be. Many will say that there is too much moralizing, but, on the other hand, the expositor who sees in the account of Creation grounds for sociological teaching and applies it to agronomics and technology is doing an inestimable service to the Protestant world in holding before it the natural law. It is too much, however, to say that this high level is maintained throughout the expository sections.

The article by H. H. Farmer on "The Significance and Authority of the Bible" seems to miss a great opportunity of speaking prophetically to the Protestant world. It speaks out of Protestantism rather than to it. He sets out to relate the authority of the Bible to that of the Church, and does so with faithfulness to the Protestant position and with his usual ability and originality. But he leaves in an unsatisfactory state the real question with which interpretation is faced and with which the problem of authority is directly concerned, namely the authority of the Bible for social conduct and morals in the light of Biblical criticism. This is Protestantism's main problem. It is discussed but hardly answered in another book, *Biblical Authority for To-day*, ed. Richardson and Schweitzer. To discuss the authority of the Bible in relation to the Church in terms of "intrinsic or organic norms" no doubt satisfies the philosopher, but there is no obvious help here for the expositor who has to relate the Bible to the awkward moral situations which he has to meet outside the church. What, for instance, is he to say about marriage and on what authority? Is he to follow the plain words of Scripture in the light of the ethical teaching of the New Testament, or is it the *testimonium spiritus sancti internum* that he is to follow even when this conflicts with the plain words of Scripture? This is a real problem for interpretation, and this would have been a good opportunity to answer it.

One can say this and yet feel that the volume is of very great importance and is likely to exercise an influence comparable with its size and cost. If the other volumes in the series, two of which have already been published on the New Testament, come up to the standard of the first, the series will be indispensable to the student of the Bible for some time to come.

LAMPETER. B. N. Y. VAUGHAN.

THE SERVANT-MESSIAH. A Study in the Public Ministry of Jesus. By T. W. Manson. Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.

Professor Manson has never shared the scepticism, explicit or implicit, of many contemporary scholars about the possibility of reconstructing in outline the course of Jesus' public ministry. More important still, he has stuck to the belief that the purpose of that ministry was defined—in teaching, in action, in death, in resurrection and commissioning of the apostles—by Jesus himself. The recreative centre of the New Testament is Jesus himself, and not the preaching Church or the imagination of the gospel writers. To say this is not to deny the importance of study of the ways in which the

preaching, worshipping Church shaped the tradition as it has come down to us, nor is it to belittle the imaginative power and distinctive apologetic or polemical preoccupations of the writers of the gospels in organizing this material. No one could accuse Professor Manson of failure to take seriously such inquiries. But his investigations, carried out over many years and now summed up in this published course of lectures, have done much to restore the confidence with which we can ask the questions: what really happened when Jesus taught in Palestine and was crucified outside Jerusalem? What did he think was happening?

Professor Manson restricts his field of inquiry: "For our purposes the fences may be erected at 63 B.C., the date of the capture of Jerusalem by Pompey, and A.D. 70, the date of the destruction of the city by Titus; but it is certain that we shall have to look over the fences, particularly the former, from time to time, and occasionally to step aside." He begins with a lengthy discussion of the Messianic hope in Jesus' day and follows it with a brief and illuminating treatment of John the Baptist, "according to Jesus, the greatest man who ever lived—outside the kingdom of God". John the Baptist is described with imagination, but there is nothing imaginary about this restatement of the N.T. view of John's ministry: it is a magnificent failure, "the last supreme effort to make an unworkable system work". So the way is prepared for the contrast and conflict between the Messianic hope of Israel even at its best and Jesus' own view of his ministry.

In the succeeding chapters—on the principles of the Messianic ministry as set forth in the teaching of Jesus, on its practice (its strategy, almost), on the passion of the Son of Man, on the Risen Christ and the Messianic succession—the argument sweeps forward from one striking piece of exegesis to another. Not everyone will agree with every interpretation; but a contrary view will have to be established in such a way as to make equal sense of the place and function of a passage or a saying in the narrative as a whole.

Many of the positions adopted in this book (e.g. the dating of the Cleansing of the Temple at the Feast of Tabernacles preceding the Passover season at which Jesus was crucified) have been argued by Professor Manson, with greater attention to technical considerations, elsewhere—for the most part in learned journals. To these he refers in footnotes. It is no weakness of the present book that it is more concerned to present conclusions than to argue processes. It becomes therefore a valuable book for the non-specialist. Indeed, in their present form, these lectures were given in Cambridge in the Michaelmas Term of 1951 to an audience only partly consisting of theological students. In view of this it would have been kind to translate the German quotation on p. 14. Readers of and listeners to Professor Manson will not be surprised that the book is written with lucidity, wit, and reverence. Once more he gives delight as well as instruction.

MELBOURNE. J. D. MCCAUGHEY.

COMMENTARY ON ROMANS. By Anders Nygren. Translated by Carl C. Rasmussen. S.C.M. Press. 30s.

Substantial works in English on the Epistle to the Romans are not plentiful. This is, perhaps, a reflection of our religious tradition and of the occasional nature of much of our theology. On the Continent, where theology tends to be more systematic, and where justification by faith has been more evidently the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae*, most Biblical theologians seem to come sooner or later to their *Römerbrief*. The latest of these, by the Bishop of Lund, is to be welcomed, even though in an American translation which is marred by frequent infelicities of expression (the publisher should not have allowed "verbiage" to stand as an equivalent for "statement"), as it makes available to English readers a notable work of theological exegesis in the full Lutheran tradition. They cannot help but learn a great deal from it even when they are provoked, as provoked they will be, to disagree with it. A running commentary without footnotes, with a minimum of Greek and that generally translated, with relatively few quotations of the opinions of other scholars and those for the most part refuted, it is both learned and vigorous.

The most striking feature of which account must be taken is the emphasis which is laid upon the orderly structure of the epistle and on the logic of the apostle's thought. Dr Nygren does not think that the understanding of Romans is helped by overmuch discussion of the possible motives for its writing, nor does he examine the question whether certain passages may represent a pre-Pauline tradition. For him Romans is marked by an "extraordinary unity and consistency of thought", and he loses no opportunity of drawing attention to links in the thought and wording which he believes the apostle to have deliberately left as signposts for our guidance, chiefly in the form of concise statements to serve as captions for what is to follow, and brief summary statements at the close of each discussion. "We need not", he says, "puzzle about his meaning, unless we ignore these helps which he supplies." Thus, the opening chapters as far as 3. 20 stand under the heading of "the wrath of God", and 3. 21–8. 39 stand under the sentence "the righteous shall live by faith". This is to be interpreted as meaning "he-who-is-by-faith-righteous shall live", an interpretation which is based not only on the argument of the epistle itself, but upon the statistical fact that in chapters 1–4 faith and its cognates occur some twenty-five times and life and its cognates only twice, while in chapters 5–8 the case is reversed, and life and its cognates are found twenty-five times and faith only twice. So 3. 21–8. 39 is governed by the two parts of this sentence; 3 21–4. 25 is concerned with the fact that it is God's own righteousness by which men shall live, and 5–8 with what kind of life it is that he-who-is-by-faith-righteous shall live. It is a life free from wrath (ch. 5), from sin (ch. 6), from the Law (ch. 7) and from death (ch. 8), and parallels are noted in the structure and thought of these four chapters. Chapters 9–11 are not an intrusion; they are evoked by the gospel message that it is God's promises that are fulfilled in Christ, and are addressed to the question "What, then, has become of the promises of God to

Israel?" The life which issues from justification is marked by two characteristics, it is life "in Christ" and it is life "in love" (chs. 12–15).

In his exegesis Dr Nygren makes no concession to "demythologizing"; on the contrary, he prefaces the commentary proper with an exposition in advance of the difficult passage 5. 12–21, in the belief that the contrast between the two aeons is the main clue throughout to the thought of the epistle. The result is that his exegesis is remarkably objective in tone but at times strangely bare in content. It would be quite impossible in the face of this commentary to repeat the caricature, which is found all too frequently in Anglican writing, that justification means a reliance on faith as a feeling. "It is not man's faith that gives the gospel its power; quite the contrary, it is the power of the gospel that makes it possible for one to believe." Nevertheless, the author seems stronger on the negative side of the gospel than on the positive. Just when one is expecting a description of what faith and righteousness actually are one has to be content with synonyms for them, and these synonyms are themselves frequently drawn from the Pauline vocabulary. "Faith is only another word for the fact that one belongs to Christ and through him participates in the new age." In the light of the author's own canon of interpretation this almost amounts to saying that to live in the new age means to live in the new age. In the earlier chapters he is at his most detailed and forceful in dealing with righteousness, sin, law, and faith, but those who regard Rom. 8 as containing some of the boldest and deepest things said in the New Testament will find him disappointingly brief and hesitant here.

Dr Nygren rejects the term "Christ-mysticism" as doing no service to Paul, but it is surely incumbent on those who insist on using the word "mysticism" in a pejorative sense only, as implying some sort of non-Christian type of union achieved by contemplation, to furnish an alternative. On the union with Christ's death and resurrection he comments: "That of which Paul speaks is a simple and unmystical reality. God has made Christ the head of a new humanity, and into that organic relationship he has brought us through baptism." Unmystical this may be; simple it certainly is not. We are left wondering what the terms "head of a new humanity" and "organic relationship" are intended to convey, and we are not given a theologically or spiritually comprehensible statement of what it means to be "in Christ" or to be united with a death and resurrection which are past events. At certain points the case which is being made is weakened by exaggeration or over-simplification, as when it is said that for Paul the gospel always stands in inescapable relation to Law, or when natural theology is dismissed on the ground that it always assumes a deistic view of the universe.

C. F. Evans.

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Oxford.

His Appearing and His Kingdom. By T. F. Glasson. Epworth Press. 16s.

"The framework which modern knowledge has created for us makes it impossible to cling to the precise forms of traditional eschatology", declares Dr Glasson. We should regard them as an incongruous synthesis of elements which in isolation are pictorial representations of important spiritual truths. By carrying further the progressive "spiritualization" of the imagery that may be traced in representative writings of former centuries, we may best discover from Christian thought some guidance about the future course of history and its climax. In a summary of his earlier book, *The Second Advent*, Dr Glasson reiterates his opinion that Jesus rejected the apocalyptic idea of messiahship. The early Church misunderstood the import of his teaching when, in spite of the mature thought of St Paul and St John, it lived in expectation of the speedy end of the world, and his return to earth by a descent in glory. The doctrine of his second coming has remained most in evidence among frustrated sects who could not rise to the "nobler conception of God, that with infinite patience he will bring about the fulfilment of his eternal purpose and the triumph of good over evil on the chessboard of the world, not suddenly interrupting the process with violence". This oft-discredited belief in an imminent advent, to be preceded by the rise of Antichrist and the Final Apostasy, has thwarted missionary enterprise and precluded hope of the ultimate reconciliation of all things to God, through his organ the Church. Dr Glasson will not quarrel with anyone who wishes to add that "history will be consummated by some supreme manifestation of the presence and power of Christ"; but he believes that man is less likely to be brought to his final state by a sudden cataclysm than by a gradual change of the conditions of human life that would fit him for a creative share in a gloriously restored universe.

There is much to admire in this book—the patient exposition and convincing refutation of the tenets of various Millenarian and Adventist movements, the emphasis on the abiding presence of Christ in his Church, the extracts from the eschatological teachings of many authors, the general lucidity which offsets an occasional sentence that is so vague as to be almost meaningless. But there is much that is challenging and to be challenged. Many readers will remain unconvinced by his discussion of the New Testament eschatology. The New Testament writers used pictorial language, which should not be taken literally. Nevertheless, rightly or wrongly, they used imagery to predict a final determinative event in history, different from and discontinuous with the series it was to conclude, rather than to preserve "spiritual values"; and the interpreting Church, so far from regarding the Advent promise as a "mythological projection into the future, in physical language, of the spiritual return in which its Vanished Master was reasserting his presence in the hearts of believers", has found significance in every crisis as a prefiguration of the ultimate intervention that would be no less irruptive than the act by

which the new age was inaugurated. Mere delay has never persuaded it that its hope was an illusion.

One would have welcomed a more searching critique of the process of "spiritualizing traditional eschatological forms", especially in view of Fr Thornton's recent attack on the "vast, uncriticized assumption that what matters for faith is not the outward form of revelation but only its 'interior' content". For all his caution, Dr Glasson does not altogether escape the danger of too readily passing judgment on the Biblical "universe of discourse" from the vantage-point of some supposedly superior modernity. It would be grossly unfair to suggest that his optimism, grounded on the Gospel victory, is a by-product of a belief in inevitable progress through the passage of time; or that he has not attempted to combine the doctrine of God's immanence in history as controlling providence with that of his transcendence as Judge of history. But the present writer suspects that his synthesis has too easily eliminated faith's tension between "confidence and evidence", perhaps because he has not made enough of the stubborn recalcitrance of "rejection" that dogs all human history. There is truth in the dictum that every age is equidistant from God. To each is presented its opportunity for response; each is marred by its own peculiar refusal.

Dr Glasson quotes with approval Dr Reinhold Niebuhr's opinion that the symbol of the second coming of Christ can neither be taken literally nor dismissed as unimportant. How would he react to the same author's condemnation of those who, "having sought to make a success story of the Biblical history of a crucified saviour, find themselves unable to cope with the tragic experiences of our day"?

C. H. Bird.

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The Making of the Restoration Settlement. By Robert S. Bosher. Dacre Press. 25s.

It is one thing to reject as too simple the elementary textbook notion that the restoration of the Anglican Church followed automatically upon Charles II's return. It is quite another matter to present a satisfactory alternative. If it were not an inevitable process, then (we are bound to ask) to whom may we assign the major responsibility for this complete reversal of the religious revolution which had been carried through by the Long Parliament and Cromwellian Triers? And, further, to what extent was the actual form of the ecclesiastical settlement fortuitous, and how far did it spring from a clearly conceived and consistently executed policy? Dr Bosher's book is important not simply because it offers definite answers to these difficult questions—for prejudice or ignorance could supply answers of an equally definite but very different kind—it is important, rather, because the answers it provides are the product of a detailed and scholarly reconstruction of the available evidence, much of it not easily available and some of it less easily interpreted. Perhaps those

who are most familiar with the problems of this complicated period will be the first to acknowledge that Dr Norman Sykes is appraising impartially as an historian what he is commending warmly as a friend when (in the Foreword) he writes: "[Dr Bosher's] skilful and careful record covers more of the facts than any other explanation of which I have knowledge; and, whilst he would not claim that he has the answers to all the questions, . . . I think that his interpretation holds the field, and will not be easily dislodged." One would only add that, so far as the delineation of the principal protagonists is concerned, there may be some who will share the reviewer's uneasiness about Dr Bosher's treatment of Edward Hyde. At any rate, readers of this book—and they should be numerous—would be well advised to read also Mr B. H. G. Wormald's *Clarendon: Politics, History, and Religion 1640-1660* and its promised sequel when it appears.

The vital clue to a right understanding of ecclesiastical developments from 1649 to 1662 is to be found in the influence of those whom Robert Baillie described in April 1660 as "that high, proud, malicious, and now very active and dangerous party", and whom Dr Bosher prefers to call "The Laudians". That description, as he admits, is a convenient rather than a strictly accurate one. He is not thinking of men who were personal disciples of that great archbishop, nor is he suggesting that they constituted an ecclesiastical "party" in the modern sense: "They were High Churchmen who shared the religious viewpoint of Laud, and who were in wholehearted agreement in their method of defending the Church's interests both before and after the Restoration . . . they thought of themselves as the faithful remnant of a persecuted Church, from which all others had fallen away." In an exceptionally fine opening chapter, which describes the state of religion under the Commonwealth, there are distinguished three groups of Anglicans: the large body who willingly conformed to the new order; the considerable number of disaffected Conformists who were rather in the nature of a fifth column within the Cromwellian Establishment; and those who would have nothing whatever to do with the Protector's policy—the "Laudians" or High Churchmen led by bishops, scholars, and theologians, like Hammond and Sheldon, Thorndike and Pearson, Taylor and Heylyn, the basis of whose policy was to identify completely the Anglican and the Royalist causes. Similarly, in the second chapter, there are distinguished three groups among the Royalist exiles after 1645: those who inclined towards an alliance with the Presbyterians to gain the support of a strong Scottish army on the King's behalf; the Romanizing party associated with Henrietta Maria, the Queen Mother; and those of the "Laudian" type, led by men like Bramhall and Cosin, who were resolved that the Church of England should maintain an independent visible existence abroad. Despite the tempting overtures of the Scottish Commissioners and the powerful Roman Catholic propaganda, it was this party that finally retained the allegiance of the King and his advisers. Between them and the "Laudians" in England contact was maintained by means of

personal agents and correspondence, and the uniting of their forces at the Restoration determined the character of the future religious settlement.

When referring, in his Bampton Lectures, to the ecclesiastical side of the Restoration, Leighton Pullan remarked that "the King's behaviour was bad, even base". After reading Dr Bosher's remaining three chapters on the "Laudian" preparation for the Restoration, the recapture of the Establishment and the exodus of the Presbyterians, one appreciates more than ever before both the justice of Pullan's terse observation and the fact that his words deserve a wider reference. The minutely detailed account of events from the Declaration of Breda to the passing of the Act of Uniformity (by which time belligerent Anglicanism was more characteristic of the House of Commons than the Bench of Bishops) makes fascinating reading. But it is disturbing to reflect upon. One may be thankful that the essentials of Anglicanism were ultimately preserved without attempting to justify all the methods which were then employed to safeguard them. The situation, it is true, was difficult and complicated in the extreme, and (let it be admitted) it is not always easy to draw the line between justifiable ambiguity and culpable duplicity, nor between the legitimate "adaptation of a policy to changing circumstances" and the use of that phrase as a euphemism for shady dealing. But if the interpretation of the "Laudian" strategy and tactics given in this book is correct, then the story is indeed a painful one for Nonconformists, an embarrassing one for High Churchmen, and an unedifying one for all. As Dr Bosher himself acknowledges in his Epilogue: "If we would claim that the preservation of the Anglican heritage in its fullness was due to the work of the Laudian party, it must be with the conviction that the Lord who rules the destinies of the Church can turn even the wrath of man to his praise."

THOMAS WOOD.

SEASCALE VICARAGE.

SHORTER NOTICES

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A. R. V.

Volume 16 of the *Ancient Christian Writers* (Longmans, 25s.) deserves a special note, in that it offers a new annotated translation from the Armenian of Irenaeus, *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching*, made by Professor J. P. Smith, S.J., with the resources of the Pontifical Biblical Institute to draw upon. Great as is the debt of English

readers to Armitage Robinson's S.P.C.K. translation, they may rightly give a special welcome to the fresh knowledge and interest of Professor Smith's.

W. T.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: E. M. Howse, *Saints in Politics* (16s.); Albert Peel and Leland H. Carson, *The Writings of Robert Harrison and Robert Browne* (35s.); A. H. Armstrong (Ed.), *Plotinus* (10s. 6d.).

BURNS OATES: Frederick Copleston, S.J., *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 3 (30s.).

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: G. G. Coulton, *Art and the Reformation* [2nd edn.] (50s.).

CHRISTIAN LITERATURE SOCIETY FOR INDIA: Surjit Singh, *Preface to Personality: Christology in Relation to Radhalkrishnan's Philosophy* (Rs 3–8).

JAMES CLARKE AND CO.: H. E. Edwards, *The Disciple Who Wrote These Things* (12s. 6d.).

DIOCESAN LITERATURE COMMITTEE, HONG KONG: Roland Koh, *The Writings of St Luke* (3s. 6d.).

DONCASTER GRAMMAR SCHOOL: R. R. Williams, *Christianity and Sound Learning: the Educational Work of C. J. Vaughan* (1s. 2d., post free).

EDITIONS NAUWELAERTS (LOUVAIN): Adolph Vykopal, *Jesus Christus, Mittelpunkt der Weltanschauung, 1. Band, Von Orpheus zur Zinne des Tempels* (Fr. 140).

ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES PRESS: A. C. Ewing, *Ethics* (6s.).

EPWORTH PRESS: Edward Smalley, *Towards an Understanding of the Gospels* (6s. 6d.).

HIGHWAY PRESS: John Drewett, *Signs of the Times: Nationalism, Communism and Christianity* (6s.).

LONGMANS: Roderic Dunkerley, *The Hope of Jesus* (15s.); Marcus Knight and L. S. Hawkes, *There's an Answer Somewhere* (7s. 6d.).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: J. F. Mozley, *Coverdale and his Bibles* (27s. 6d.).

MACMILLAN: W. T. Stace, *Religion and the Modern Mind* (2s.).

PETER NEVILL: C. G. Campbell, *Race and Religion* (15s.).

OLIVER AND BOYD: William Manson, G. W. H. Lampe, T. F. Torrance and W. A. Whitehouse, *Eschatology* (6s.).

RIDLEY HALL: F. W. B. Bullock, *The History of Ridley Hall, Cambridge*, Vol. II (26s.).

SHEED AND WARD: E. I. Watkin, *Poets and Mystics* (21s.).

SKEFFINGTON: Ruth Cranston, *World Faith* (10s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: Lumsden Barkway, *The Creed and its Credentials* [revised edition: first edition reviewed in THEOLOGY, January 1936, pp. 55 f.] (4s.); Frank Houghton, *Amy Carmichael of Dohnavur* (12s. 6d.); Ernest Evans, *Saint Augustine's Enchiridion* (15s.); C. B. Moss, *What do we mean by Reunion?* (6s. 6d.); Michael Furse, *Stand therefore!* (17s. 6d.).

ZWINGLI-VERLAG ZÜRICH: Th. C. Vriezen, *Die Erwählung Israels nach dem Alten Testament* (Fr. 12.50); Werner Georg Kümmel, *Verhibung und Erfüllung* (Fr. 15.60); A. Rich, *Pascals Bild vom Menschen* (Fr. 13.95).

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